Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Goga, No. SC2024-0669 (Fla. July 9, 2026)
On July 9, 2026, the Florida Supreme Court held that a trial court’s decision to dismiss a complaint as a sanction for a party’s fraud on the court is reviewable under the traditional abuse of discretion standard rather than the “more stringent” or “narrowed” abuse of discretion standard applied by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
In Goga, Jonida Goga filed a personal injury lawsuit against Publix, claiming a fall at a Publix store caused her severe and lasting physical limitations. However, a private investigator hired by Publix recorded Goga performing many of the activities she repeatedly claimed under oath that she could no longer do. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Goga had intentionally and repeatedly lied about her physical limitations, concluding that her fraud “comprehensively infect[ed] the integrity” of the action, and dismissed her lawsuit with prejudice. On appeal, the Fourth District did not find error with the trial court’s determination that Goga committed fraud on the court, but nonetheless reversed dismissal and created a new, reduced sanction that Goga would be barred from pursuing pain and suffering damages and lost wages but was free to pursue medical damages that could be proved by objective evidence. In so holding, the Fourth District applied a “more stringent” or “narrowed” abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s determination that dismissal of the entire lawsuit was an appropriate sanction for Goga’s fraudulent conduct. This conflicted with the Third District’s decision in Willie-Koonce, which applied a “narrowed” abuse of discretion to the trial court’s factual findings, and the First District’s decision in Pro Choice Remediation, which applied traditional, bifurcated standards of review rather than any special fraud-specific standard.
On review to the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida Justice Reform Institute submitted an amicus curiae in support of Publix, arguing that the determination of an appropriate remedy for a litigant’s abuse of the judicial system is properly within the trial court’s broad discretion and highlighting the case law supporting the trial court’s dismissal of Goga’s lawsuit due to her egregious conduct.
The Court held that the traditional abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial court’s decision on which sanction to impose on a litigant who commits fraud on the court, not a “more stringent” or “narrowed” abuse of discretion standard. The Court approved of the First District’s approach in Pro Choice, holding that a trial court’s factual findings on fraud should be reviewed for competent, substantial evidence; its legal conclusion on whether the facts amount to fraud on the court should be reviewed de novo; and its choice of sanction should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Court rejected the “more stringent” or “narrowed” abuse of discretion standard used by the Third and Fourth Districts because it is based on flawed justifications and resulted in unpredictable and inconsistent application by appellate courts. Applying the traditional abuse of discretion standard, the Court concluded that dismissal of the entire complaint was not unreasonable given the abundance and gravity of Goga’s lies. Accordingly, the Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the trial court’s order dismissing Goga’s entire complaint with prejudice.
The Florida Justice Reform Institute was represented by William W. Large and by Tiffany Roddenberry and Kathryn Isted of Holland & Knight LLP.
