In MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Coloplast Corp., the Third District Court of Appeal held that there was no personal jurisdiction over defendants that designed, manufactured, and sold pelvic surgical mesh products in a lawsuit to recover payments that various Medicare entities had to make for the medical care and treatment of injuries allegedly resulting from the implantation of those pelvic surgical mesh products.
In this case, rather than bringing claims directly against Coloplast—the alleged designers, manufacturers, and sellers of the pelvic surgical mesh products—Medicare organizations instead assigned claims to the plaintiffs in this case, collectively referred to as “MSP.” MSP filed a complaint against Coloplast for a pure bill of discovery, ultimately seeking reimbursement of the claims paid by Medicare for treatment of the injuries allegedly resulting from the pelvic surgical mesh products. The trial court dismissed the complaint on two independent grounds: (1) there was no personal jurisdiction over Coloplast; and (2) MSP failed to state a cause of action for a pure bill of discovery.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal on the basis of personal jurisdiction and expressed no opinion on the issue of whether MSP failed to state a cause of action for a pure bill of discovery. Among other things, the court held that there was no personal jurisdiction under the statutes providing for personal jurisdiction over personal injuries and torts, as this was a Medicare reimbursement case, not a personal injury action.
The Florida Justice Reform Institute (“FJRI”), in an amicus brief joined by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, argued that the trial court was correct on its second basis for dismissing MSP’s complaint—for MSP’s failure to state a cause of action for a pure bill of discovery. The amicus brief argued that an action for a pure bill of discovery—which seeks relief in the form of discovery that can inform a plaintiff whether it has a legitimate claim to begin with—is a relic of a bygone era that has limited use in the context of modern discovery. The amicus brief further pointed out that Florida state courts have construed this cause of action narrowly in modern times and that the cause of action is not available to plaintiffs like MSP whose business model is to file as many claims assigned to it as possible and, in nothing more than fishing expeditions, evaluate after litigation has already begun which of those claims have merit.
By affirming the trial court’s dismissal on the basis of personal jurisdiction, the Third District allowed itself to avoid addressing the issue of whether MSP had stated a claim for a pure bill of discovery. But the court’s decision not to reverse the trial court’s dismissal of MSP’s claim for failure to state a claim for a pure bill of discovery is consistent with many of the arguments set forth in FJRI’s amicus brief and helps prevent overzealous litigants from using this cause of action abusively.
FJRI represented by Joseph H. Lang, Jr. and D. Matthew Allen of Carlton Fields, P.A., and William W. Large.